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THE JUVENILE JUSTICE LEGACY OF 
CHIEF JUSTICE RALPH GANTS 
JUSTICE BARBARA LENK (RET.)* 
DAVID RASSOUL RANGAVIZ** 
Abstract: The late Chief Justice Ralph Gants was a catalyst for criminal justice re-
form and a champion for young people within the justice system. In his work on 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Chief Justice Gants committed himself 
to ensuring that children in juvenile court be treated as youths in need of help and 
never as criminals in need of punishment. While always respecting proper institu-
tional boundaries, Chief Justice Gants worked to reduce the scope of juveniles’ in-
volvement in the justice system where possible, limit the harmful effects of such 
involvement on young people, their families, and their communities, and provide 
youths with an expanded opportunity for release upon proven rehabilitation. This 
Article explores Chief Justice Gants’s influential legacy in the area of juvenile jus-
tice—a legacy left through both his opinions and advocacy—and what efforts he 
might have made on these issues in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
As a Justice, and then Chief Justice, Ralph Gants was a man ahead of his 
time. He was committed to reforming the criminal legal system long before the 
current movement for reform. In Massachusetts, he was, in many ways, the 
impetus for that reform. His opinions and speeches opened people’s eyes to the 
reality of the system—its lengthy sentences, racial disparities, and failure to 
reduce recidivism. 
 In the context of juvenile justice, his commitment to reform was, if an-
ything, yet stronger. The problems that plague our criminal legal system for 
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adults equally affect the system for young people. Chief Justice Gants recog-
nized that juveniles in the legal system are overwhelmingly children living in 
poverty, children of color, and children with high rates of trauma.1 He under-
stood the negative consequences that the system itself can impose.2 As he rec-
ognized, juveniles in the legal system are more likely to reoffend later in life, a 
risk that increases the sooner they become involved in the system.3 Chief Jus-
tice Gants dedicated his life to solving problems through the court process, yet 
at the same time, he is one of the jurists most responsible for reducing the 
scope and scale of the courts’ involvement in children’s lives. In the juvenile 
legal system especially, Chief Justice Gants understood that less can be more.4 
His opinions reflected that understanding.5 
 Chief Justice Gants did not act without constraint, however, as he rec-
ognized the limited role of the judiciary and respected institutional lines of au-
thority.6 He did what he could where he could, and when he could not, he 
urged every other actor in the system to do their part.7 Being Chief Justice of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) is an enormous job, but he 
somehow made it even bigger. He was always bold; his brilliance coupled with 
his compassion proved to be a mighty force. 
Although Chief Justice Gants accomplished much in this area, he was far 
from finished. This Article discusses Chief Justice Gants’s juvenile justice leg-
acy through the opinions he wrote and the juvenile justice positions he might 
have urged in the remaining years he should have had on the SJC as its Chief 
Justice.8 Part I describes Chief Justice Gants’s past juvenile justice opinions.9 
Part II then considers where he might have taken us in the future with further 
reforms to the juvenile legal system.10 Part II acknowledges that Chief Justice 
Gants’s legacy is not complete, and so we offer brief thoughts on how he might 
have completed it. By its nature, that is an impossible task; Chief Justice Gants 
saw subtleties in issues and arguments that few others could appreciate. It is 
hard to keep up with a man ahead of his time. Still, if we trust that past is pro-
logue, we may learn from what he did to predict what he might have done. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See infra notes 17–38 and accompanying text. 
 2 See infra notes 17–38 and accompanying text. 
3 Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth, 122 N.E.3d 532, 541 (Mass. 2019) (“[C]hildren who enter the ju-
venile justice system have a higher risk of reoffending for the remainder of their lives, and . . . their 
risk of recidivism is greater the earlier they enter the system.”). 
 4 See infra notes 47–61 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 47–61 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 17–38 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 47–61 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 12–85 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 12–72 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 73–85 and accompanying text. 
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At a time when a conservative majority on the United States Supreme 
Court seems loathe to push juvenile justice reform any further as a matter of fed-
eral law, future decisions from the SJC will likely be the only source of protec-
tion for Massachusetts juveniles caught up in the legal system.11 That both 
heightens the tragedy of his loss and the importance of learning from his legacy. 
I. CHIEF JUSTICE GANTS’S JUVENILE JUSTICE DECISIONS 
In decisions authored by Chief Justice Gants, the SJC took major steps to 
protect and advocate for the best interests of juveniles in the justice system.12 
Section A of this Part discusses a number of Chief Justice Gants’s opinions that 
sought to protect juveniles from the harms that the system itself inflicts.13 Sec-
tion B explores Chief Justice Gants’s efforts to interpret the 2018 Criminal Jus-
tice Reform Act to expand protections for juveniles.14 Section C discusses his 
opinions that called on other institutional actors to change either the law or the 
practice of how they treat juvenile offenders. In particular, this section primari-
ly focuses on Chief Justice Gants’s advocacy to end the use of juvenile offens-
es as enhancements for later adult sentences and his admonishment of the Pa-
role Board for its failure to give serious consideration to release requests of 
those convicted of murder as juveniles.15 Finally, Section D explores the 
court’s cases decided during his time as Chief going about as far as any state 
high court in the country in expanding the rights of juvenile homicide offend-
ers—even disallowing life without the possibility of parole in all cases.16 Chief 
Justice Gants left an enormous legacy. 
A. Recognizing and Limiting the Harm of the Justice  
System on Juveniles and Communities 
In 2013, in Commonwealth v. Humberto H., the SJC, with then-Justice 
Gants writing, held that juvenile court judges have the discretion to dismiss 
delinquency complaints for lack of probable cause on their face, even prior to 
arraignment, so long as the dismissal was in the best interests of the juvenile 
and of fairness.17 In his opinion for the court, the Chief showed his understand-
ing of the importance of recognizing that authority when he described how “a 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1318 (2021) (holding in a divided opinion that a 
judge “need not make . . . a . . . factual finding of permanent incorrigibility” before imposing a discre-
tionary sentence of life without parole on a juvenile). 
 12 See infra notes 13–72 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 17–38 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 39–46 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 47–61 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text. 
 17 998 N.E.2d 1003, 1014 (Mass. 2013). 
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juvenile’s name and charge” would be filed in the Court Activity Record In-
formation (CARI) during initial proceedings, thereby establishing a permanent 
record that, at least at that time, could never be expunged.18 
 Due to the harmful effects of a CARI record, and the juvenile legal sys-
tem’s commitment to rehabilitation and redemption, he wrote that juvenile 
court judges must have “broad discretion” to dismiss charges unsupported by 
probable cause before arraignment.19 Chief Justice Gants understood the life-
long stigma that can attach at arraignment when he described the great signifi-
cance of shielding a juvenile from the shame and other consequences associat-
ed with being perceived as a criminal.20 Consequently, he sought to ensure that 
judges could spare children that harm at least where the charges were not sup-
ported by probable cause, and would not otherwise result in a delinquency ad-
judication.21 In such cases, great harm would be inflicted for no reason. 
The SJC reached that result, in the words of Justice Spina’s dissent, by 
applying what had heretofore been used as a “dispositional theory”—the “best 
interests of the child” analysis—to “the manner in which the rules of criminal 
procedure are applied.”22 Before Humberto H., that sort of analysis had been 
reserved only for the dispositional phase of a case and not for its judgment or 
procedural aspects.23 After the Chief’s innovative decision, however, that was 
no longer the case. And although the decision recognized that novel authority 
to dismiss cases prior to arraignment, it also carried an even more expansive 
implication: all procedural rules governing juvenile adjudication must be read 
through a rehabilitative lens.24 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See id. at 1012 (describing the significance of a CARI record in relation to the preliminary 
decision of whether to charge a child with a criminal offense). The Legislature has since added an 
expungement provision in the 2018 Criminal Justice Reform Act that allows discretionary expunge-
ment of CARI records in limited circumstances. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100K (2020). 
19 Humberto H., 998 N.E.2d at 1014–15. At that time, mere possession of less than one ounce of 
marijuana would have only been a civil infraction. Id. at 1010. Consequently, then-Justice Gants also 
noted that prosecutors and police might be inclined to overcharge an otherwise civil violator, so judg-
es had to be careful in ensuring probable cause, especially for the intent to distribute element. See id. 
at 1010–11 (describing that where intent to distribute is lacking, criminal prosecution contravenes the 
public policy of treating such marijuana possession as a civil violation). 
20 See id. at 1014 (describing the purpose of the juvenile legal system to include improvement and 
recovery of children). 
 21 See id. at 1015 (noting that although a judge does not have the power to “expunge a CARI 
record” under such circumstances, he does have authority to prevent the creation of a CARI record 
when probable cause is lacking). 
22 See id. at 1015–16 (Spina, J., dissenting) (noting that contemporary jurisprudence has doubted 
the appropriateness of the “best interest” analysis for procedural and judgment-related components of 
a case). 
23 See id. at 1016. 
 24 See id. at 1014 (majority opinion) (quoting Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 961 N.E.2d 581, 
584 (Mass. 2012)) (describing the justice system for children as predominantly “rehabilitative”). 
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That principle was not without limitation, however. In 2018, in Common-
wealth v. Newton N., Chief Justice Gants wrote the decision for a unanimous 
court declining to recognize a broad, freestanding power for juvenile court 
judges to dismiss delinquency complaints prior to arraignment where the 
charge is supported by probable cause.25 Without explicit legislative authoriza-
tion to the contrary, when a charge is supported by probable cause, the Chief 
explained, the choice to pursue prosecution remains in the prosecutor’s com-
prehensive and sole authority.26 Chief Justice Gants respected the separation of 
powers.27 
But the Chief could not just leave it at that; that was not his way. With his 
concluding paragraphs, he emphasized that—because of this institutional ar-
rangement—the community and the court depend on prosecutors to exercise 
reasonable judgment in determining whether to arraign a child, citing the pros-
ecutorial duty to do justice and “temper[] zeal with human kindness.”28 Rec-
ognizing the mental health issues of the particular juvenile whose case was on 
review, Chief Justice Gants encouraged diversion prior to arraignment “as an 
alternative to prosecution.”29 Although he acknowledged the limitations of the 
court’s authority, that did not stop him from exhorting the empowered party—
the prosecutor—to consider the child’s best interests when deciding whether to 
place charges on his record forever.30 
In 2013, in Commonwealth v. Hanson H, Chief Justice Gants again high-
lighted the magnitude of the stigma and trauma that children suffer when 
                                                                                                                           
 25 89 N.E.3d 1159, 1166 (Mass. 2018). 
26 Id. 
 27 See id. (noting that to hold otherwise would allow for an unsupportable intrusion by the judici-
ary into the executive branch). 
28 See id. at 1167 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., The Federal Prosecutor, 
Address at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys 7 (Apr. 1, 1940), https://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/16/04-01-1940.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B5B-TST8]). 
29 See id. at 1167–68 (noting that most district attorneys have created “juvenile pretrial diversion 
programs”). As was his wont, Chief Justice Gants did not give up on the juvenile in the case itself. In 
remanding, his opinion instructed the prosecutor to determine anew whether to continue with arraign-
ment, and in doing so to assess all new information that has been gained about the juvenile since the 
original hearing on the motion to dismiss. Id. at 1168. In the context of pre-arraignment dismissal of 
charges initiated by private complaint, Chief Justice Gants also wrote the decision for the SJC—issued 
the same day as Commonwealth v. Newton N., 89 N.E.3d at 1166—holding that a Juvenile Court 
judge has discretion to dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment before the Commonwealth formally 
moves for arraignment, but no such discretion thereafter. Commonwealth v. Orbin O., 89 N.E.3d 
1151, 1157 (Mass. 2018). He again emphasized the need for “wise exercise of discretion” by the 
Commonwealth in deciding whether to move forward with private delinquency complaints. Id. at 
1158. 
 30 See Newton N., 89 N.E.3d at 1167–68 (noting that prosecutors may consider diversion pro-
grams for eligible juveniles, instead of prosecution). 
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courts treat them like criminals.31 There, he wrote the SJC’s opinion holding 
that the mandatory imposition of GPS monitoring required by statute for those 
convicted of sex offenses did not apply to “juveniles who have been adjudicat-
ed delinquent.”32 His opinion explained how such a severe condition, imposed 
on a mandatory basis, clashed with the “broad discretion” generally afforded 
juvenile court judges, ostracized the child, and potentially hindered his rehabil-
itation.33 Again, just as in Humberto H., Chief Justice Gants saw the multitude 
of consequences that the juvenile legal system can have on children.34 He viv-
idly used the facts of the case to show that effect—describing how the juvenile 
had become “withdrawn, anxious and depressed” by having the GPS device 
affixed to his ankle and had stopped participating in after-school programs and 
sports that he had previously enjoyed.35 
In reaching this decision, the SJC also established a new rule of statutory 
interpretation for juvenile cases: where the Legislature intends to treat adult 
defendants and juveniles identically, it must do so with special clarity.36 This 
requirement was predicated on the understanding that equal treatment “funda-
mentally conflict[s] with” the established norm, codified in Massachusetts law, 
that juveniles in the system should not be regarded as convicts, but rather “as 
children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.”37 Like his decision in 
Humberto H.—which expanded the “best interests of the child” analysis from 
a dispositional principle to an interpretive one—the Chief’s opinion resolving 
the particular statutory issue before the court also announced a broader inter-
pretive presumption against the identical treatment of children and adults.38 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See 985 N.E.2d 1179, 1185 (Mass. 2013) (noting the “potential adverse impact” of a GPS de-
vice on a child’s recovery). 
 32 Id. at 1186. 
33 Id. at 1185 (first quoting Police Comm’r of Bos. v. Mun. Ct. Dorchester Dist., 374 N.E.2d 272, 
287 (Mass. 1978); and then quoting Commonwealth v. Balboni, 642 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Mass. 1994)). 
 34 See Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 998 N.E.2d 1003, 1012 (Mass. 2013) (describing the 
adverse consequences of a CARI record on a juvenile’s wellbeing); see also Hanson H., 985 N.E.2d at 
1186 (describing the “inherently stigmatizing” effects of the GPS device on the juvenile). 
35 Hanson H., 985 N.E.2d at 1186 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the attestation of 
the juvenile’s mother). 
36 Id. (“Where the Legislature intends to depart from this statutory principle and mandate a condi-
tion of probation for a juvenile, we trust it will do so with more clarity than we find in § 47.”); id. at 
1181 (“[W]e will not interpret a statute affecting the delinquency adjudications of juveniles to conflict 
with this principle in the absence of clear legislative intent.”). 
 37 Id. at 1185; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 53 (2020). 
 38 Hanson H., 985 N.E.2d at 1185 (emphasizing the importance of judicial discretion to imple-
ment the “redemptive principles” at the core of juvenile matters); see Humberto H., 998 N.E.2d at 
1016 (Spina, J., dissenting) (describing the expansion of the “best interest” analysis into judgment and 
procedural aspects of a case). 
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B. Expanding Protections for Juveniles Through Criminal Justice Reform 
In addition to his decisions seeking to reduce the harm inflicted on young 
people by the juvenile legal system, Chief Justice Gants was also a major driv-
er behind the 2018 Criminal Justice Reform Act that included significant 
changes to the juvenile legal system.39 When it came time to interpret the new 
law, the SJC protected all children who fell within its scope.40 In 2019, in 
Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth, the SJC—in another opinion authored by Chief 
Justice Gants—concluded the narrowed definition of “delinquent child,” that 
raised the age for juvenile court jurisdiction from seven to twelve, applied ret-
roactively to all cases still pending in the juvenile court, even if the incident in 
question had occurred prior to the enactment of the new law.41 
Mere prospective application, Chief Justice Gants wrote, would be “re-
pugnant” to the legislation’s purpose of “reduc[ing] the number of children 
who enter the juvenile justice system” in order to “combat[] the negative ef-
fects of Juvenile Court involvement on children and their communities.”42 The 
Chief’s “repugnancy” analysis was quite distinct from how the court had con-
ducted its analysis in past cases involving adult criminal defendants, again 
showing his strong belief in the need for strict separation between juvenile and 
adult proceedings.43 The analysis was also quite novel: by its reasoning, one 
might well think that all statutes narrowing juvenile liability ought to be ap-
plied retroactively, as the refusal to do so would unavoidably contravene the 
legislative purpose reflected in the narrowed statute.44 
Also buried in this staid retroactivity decision was an extraordinary ob-
servation: involvement in the system itself harms children, and the need to 
avoid that harm justified an expansive reading of the 2018 Criminal Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See An Act Relative to Criminal Justice Reform, ch. 69, 2018 Mass. Acts 2d Ann. Sess. 59 (set-
ting forth the various provisions of the reform); Shira Schoenberg, Massachusetts Chief Justice Ralph 
Gants Urges Legal Reforms to Reduce Recidivism, MASSLIVE, https://www.masslive.com/politics/2017/
10/chief_justice_ralph_gants_urge.html [https://perma.cc/96N8-WDVP] (Jan. 7, 2019) (describing how 
Chief Justice Gants used his yearly State of the Judiciary address in 2017 to underscore the need to en-
sure that defendants leaving prison have mental health treatment and professional training to decrease 
recidivism). 
 40 See Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth, 122 N.E.3d 532, 536, 543 (Mass. 2019). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 541–42. 
43 See id. at 541; Commonwealth v. Dotson, 966 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Mass. 2012) (holding that, 
when the Legislature narrowed the statutory definition of a crime, prospective application “may be, in 
the defendant’s view, an unfair consequence . . . but it does not rise to the level of repugnancy”). 
 44 See Lazlo L., 122 N.E.3d at 541–42 (describing the Legislature’s purpose of “giving children 
. . . a second chance” by limiting the potential for involvement with the Juvenile Court). 
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Reform Act to keep as many children out of court as possible.45 Chief Justice 
Gants was an unrivaled courtroom problem solver, but he also understood the 
unintended harm that courts themselves can cause.46 
C. Calling on Those in Power to Minimize the Impact  
of the Justice System on Juveniles 
Even when he did not write for the court’s majority, Chief Justice Gants 
never shied away from writing separately to encourage other actors in the ju-
venile legal system—both prosecutors and the Legislature—to lessen the se-
verity and footprint of that system.47 In particular, he wrote separately to urge 
legislative changes that he thought necessary to reduce the chain of conse-
quences that can follow young people who have been adjudicated delinquent 
for the rest of their lives.48 
In 2018, in Commonwealth v. Baez, the SJC unanimously held that juve-
nile delinquency adjudications for violent offenses could constitute predicate 
offenses for purposes of the state Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which 
creates an escalating set of mandatory minimum sentences based upon the 
number of predicate qualifying offenses on a defendant’s record.49 Although he 
was constrained to agree with the court’s analysis, Chief Justice Gants con-
curred separately “to encourage the Legislature to consider the wisdom and 
fairness of the mandatory minimum aspect of those enhanced sentences, espe-
cially where the predicate offenses were committed when the defendant was a 
juvenile.”50 
Although he generally disapproved of all mandatory minimums,51 Chief 
Justice Gants clearly felt that imposing a mandatory minimum based upon past 
juvenile offenses was uniquely unfair. In his Baez concurrence, Chief Justice 
Gants emphasized the disconnect between the law’s colloquial name—the 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See id. at 541 (noting that the Legislature recognized that juveniles moving through the justice 
system experience an elevated risk of recidivism); see also An Act Relative to Criminal Justice Re-
form, ch. 69, 2018 Mass. Acts 2d Ann. Sess. 59. 
 46 See Lazlo L., 122 N.E.3d at 541 (describing how the sooner a juvenile becomes involved in the 
system, the higher the likelihood that they will also remain involved in the system throughout their 
life). 
 47 See infra notes 49–61 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 49–61 and accompanying text. 
 49 104 N.E.3d 646, 647, 650 (Mass. 2018); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10G (2014), 
held unconstitutional in part by Commonwealth v. Beal, 52 N.E.3d 998 (Mass. 2016). 
50 Baez, 104 N.E.3d at 650 (Gants, C.J., concurring). 
 51 The Chief had long been an opponent of mandatory sentencing regimes: he requested their 
abolition “in his first State of the Judiciary Address in 2014,” did the same when “testifying before the 
Joint Committee on the Judiciary in 2015,” and engaged Harvard to assess racial inequities in sentenc-
ing in 2016. See Jared B. Cohen, Careful Scrutiny: The SJC and Mandatory Sentencing Laws, BOS. 
BAR J., Summer Edition 2021, at 16, 20 n.5. 
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Armed Career Criminal Act—and what it actually did.52 He explained that many, 
if not the majority, of defendants facing mandatory minimum sentences pursuant 
to the ACCA may not reasonably be described as “armed career criminals,” par-
ticularly when they engaged in their predicate offenses as children.53 Under the 
state ACCA, predicate convictions may also include quite minor offenses—
assault and battery, unarmed robbery, and resisting arrest, among others.54 
The Chief also urged the idea that subjecting someone to years of addi-
tional mandatory punishment based on something they might have done as 
young as age seven would be fundamentally unjust.55 At such a young age, the 
likelihood that the offense was the product of immaturity or impulsivity caused 
by an undeveloped brain is just too compelling to allow it to be the basis for a 
later severe mandatory adult sentence.56 Given the differences between juve-
                                                                                                                           
 52 104 N.E.3d at 650–51 (Gants, C.J., concurring). 
53 Id. 
54 Ch. 269, § 10G. See generally Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 128 N.E.3d 14 (Mass. 2019) (in-
corporating assault and battery through the ACCA’s “force clause”); Commonwealth v. Mora, 77 
N.E.3d 298 (Mass. 2017) (incorporating unarmed robbery through the ACCA’s “force clause”). Alt-
hough the state ACCA shares its name with a federal statute, the two bear little resemblance to one 
another. See Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), held unconstitutional in part 
by Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); Ch. 269, § 10G. As Chief Justice Gants pointed 
out, the federal law imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum for those convicted of three prior 
“violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s].” Baez, 104 N.E.3d at 650 (Gants, C.J., concurring) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 963 N.E.2d 704, 714 n.10 
(Mass. 2012)). The Massachusetts law, on the other hand, is far more punitive, as it introduces a tiered 
series of punishments starting from the very first qualifying predicate offense. Ch. 269, § 10G. Under 
the state ACCA, one predicate gives rise to a three-year mandatory minimum; two results in ten years; 
and three predicates, just like under federal law, fifteen years. Id. And although the statutory language 
defining a “violent felony” in the federal ACCA is similar to the Massachusetts ACCA’s definition of 
a “violent crime,” in practice the federal definition is considerably narrower as a result of a judicial 
construction that has not been followed in Massachusetts courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (defin-
ing a “violent felony” to include an act punishable for a time period over one year or any act of “juve-
nile delinquency” pertaining to the utilization of a lethal weapon); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 121 
(2021), held unconstitutional in part by Beal, 52 N.E.3d at 998 (describing a “violent crime” as the 
same). Compare Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247–48 (2016) (using an elements-based 
approach and holding that a crime is categorically excluded from the definition of a “violent crime” so 
long as there is any way to commit the crime without violence), with Wentworth, 128 N.E.3d at 22 
(“[T]he Commonwealth may be able to show that a crime was ‘violent’ even if the elements of the 
crime alone do not show that it was violent.”). 
 55 See Baez, 104 N.E.3d at 651 (Gants, C.J., concurring) (noting that in the matter at issue, the 
defendant was merely fifteen years of age when he undertook his prior predicate offenses). 
56 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (recognizing that juveniles are categorically 
distinct from adults for purposes of sentencing); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (same); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (same). The differences between juveniles and 
adults, for purposes of sentencing, manifest in three main ways, according to the Supreme Court: (1) 
juveniles do not have the sensibility of adults and experience a limited sense of accountability, result-
ing in “recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking”; (2) juveniles are more susceptible to 
negative influences and external stressors within their community, and “lack the ability to extricate 
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings”; and (3) children’s personality, behaviors, and 
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niles and adults, in his view, “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided 
to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult . . . .”57 
Massachusetts is one of the only states that allows enhancements using 
juvenile delinquency adjudications.58 Following the 2018 Criminal Justice Re-
form Act, those enhancements could be regarded as especially unfair in certain 
circumstances. In particular, because the legislation raised the minimum age of 
juvenile court jurisdiction from seven to twelve, a juvenile now cannot be 
found delinquent based upon conduct that occurs before they turn twelve, but 
adults who were found delinquent in the past (for conduct between the ages of 
seven and twelve) can still have mandatory minimum sentences imposed using 
those offenses as predicates.59 For Mr. Baez, the enhancement meant his min-
imum punishment increased from eighteen months to ten years in prison, all 
due to two offenses committed at age fifteen.60 The Legislature is currently 
considering legislation that would do essentially what Chief Justice Gants 
called for: prevent the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences based up-
on juvenile adjudications.61 When Chief Justice Gants spoke, many listened. 
                                                                                                                           
qualities are “less fixed” than those of an adult, and therefore their conduct is less likely to demon-
strate “irretrievable depravity.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 207 (2016) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471). 
57 Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
58 See Beth Caldwell, Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes as Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 645–53 (2012) (explaining, in the most recent compre-
hensive survey of the law conducted in 2012, that Massachusetts is one of only three states that allows 
mandatory minimum sentences to be enhanced by juvenile adjudications, the others being California 
and Texas). The federal ACCA also allows juvenile adjudications to be used as predicate offenses, 
although federal law treats fewer offenses as predicates. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(C) (defining “con-
viction” to include a determination that an individual has undertaken conduct of “juvenile delinquency 
involving a violent felony”); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining the narrower 
judicial construction of “violent felony” under the federal ACCA). 
 59 See Baez, 104 N.E.3d at 647 (describing how the ACCA requires heightened sentencing for 
adults who violate certain provisions of Massachusetts law and who have already been “convicted of a 
violent crime or of a serious drug offense” (internal quotation marks omitted)  
(quoting Ch. 269, § 10G)). 
60 Id. at 647 n.3. 
61 See S.B. 1022, 192d Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2021), https://malegislature.gov/Bills/192/SD138 [https://
perma.cc/5SY4-BJWM] (eliminating only the enhanced mandatory minimum sentences for illegal gun 
possession). A similar bill last session would have eliminated all uses of prior juvenile adjudications 
for enhanced sentencing, but it did not become law. See S.B. 845, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2019), https://
malegislature.gov/Bills/191/S845 [https://perma.cc/ZT9S-BZC6] (setting forth the provisions relating 
to the prevention of “mandatory minimum sentences” predicated on juvenile judgments). Aside from 
the gun possession statute, other provisions of Massachusetts law that require enhanced mandatory 
minimum sentences based on prior juvenile adjudications are: (1) commission of “indecent assault and 
battery on a child under . . . 14”; (2) rape and “abuse [of] a child under 16 years of age”; (3) “entice-
ment of a child under age 18 to engage in prostitution, human trafficking or commercial sexual activi-
ty”; and (4) additional trafficking crimes. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, §§ 13B3/4, 23B, 26D, 52 
(2021). Even if the pending bill becomes law, juvenile adjudications could still enhance these sex 
offense mandatory minimum sentences. 
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D. Expanding the Rights of Juvenile Homicide Offenders 
Finally, Chief Justice Gants’s time on the SJC coincided with a sea 
change in the sentencing treatment of juveniles convicted of first-degree mur-
der, with the Chief either drafting or joining all opinions for the court on the 
subject.62 When he first took his seat on the court, those juveniles were still 
subject to mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court struck down such a mandatory regime in 2012 in Mil-
ler v. Alabama, which the SJC then extended to disallow any sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole, mandatory and discretionary alike, for juve-
nile offenders.63 The SJC also ensured that juvenile homicide offenders have a 
right to counsel at parole proceedings, funds for experts, and judicial review 
from the Parole Board’s decision.64 
Of course, a parole board is no more able to subject a juvenile to life in 
prison than a sentencing judge. In 2020, in Deal v. Massachusetts Parole 
Board, the SJC upheld the denial of a juvenile homicide offender’s request for 
parole.65 Yet again, as in Baez and so many other cases, Chief Justice Gants 
could not simply leave it there. If constitutionality hinges on eligibility for pa-
role—which requires a genuine opportunity to secure release based on 
“demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”—then the parole process must af-
ford the juvenile a real chance to win release.66 The Chief wrote separately in 
Deal to express just how much the Parole Board’s approach to these juvenile 
homicide cases troubled him. In all of them, the Parole Board seemed to rely 
on identical “boilerplate language” that did not reflect “meaningful individual-
ized analysis” of each case.67 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See infra notes 63–85 and accompanying text. 
63 See 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that a judge or jury are required to have the chance to 
consider all factors before inflicting the most severe punishment for juveniles); Diatchenko v. Dist. 
Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 276, 282, 285 (Mass. 2013) (holding that discretionary imposi-
tion of a life sentence without parole for a child offender constitutes “cruel or unusual punishments”). 
64 Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 27 N.E.3d 349, 367 (Mass. 2015). 
65 142 N.E.3d 77, 84 (Mass. 2020). 
66 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010); see Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 
212 (2016) (stating that the possibility for release may be provided to juveniles who exhibit the “truth 
of Miller’s central intuition” that children who undertake even horrible crimes are able to rehabilitate 
themselves); Diatchenko, 27 N.E.3d at 356 (emphasizing that the possibility of parole is a key element 
of the constitutionality of sentencing “for a juvenile homicide offender subject to mandatory life in 
prison”). See generally Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release: Graham, 
Miller and California’s Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 
292 (2016) (“Vague standards directing parole boards to consider youthful characteristics or the di-
minished culpability of youth do not go far enough.”); Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: 
Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 412 (2014) 
(“[U]nder Graham, a meaningful opportunity for release means a realistic one.”). 
67 Deal, 142 N.E.3d at 85–86. (Gants, C.J., concurring). 
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Although his opinion was styled as a concurrence, it had the feel of a dis-
sent. He wrote that the Parole Board had “fail[ed] to meet [the] requirement” 
of individualized consideration required by the Constitution.68 He described 
the Parole Board’s approach to these cases: “Essentially, the board simply 
identifies the so-called Miller factors and declares in all these cases that it con-
sidered them, without demonstrating in any way how it considered them.”69 As 
Chief Justice Gants described it, the Parole Board seemed to cut and paste text 
verbatim from its juvenile lifer decisions, only changing the name of the per-
son denied parole.70 He also noted how the Parole Board’s decision denying 
Deal parole suggested that they might have thought him guilty of a greater 
crime (first-degree murder) than his actual crime of conviction (second-degree 
murder).71 
In the last line of his concurrence, Chief Justice Gants included what can 
only be seen as a warning to the Board: at any future parole hearing for these 
juvenile offenders, he said, “we would expect meaningful individualized find-
ings that are far less conclusory and perfunctory than here.”72 
II. THE CHIEF’S LOST LEGACY 
Although the cases discussed above are not the entirety of the Chief’s juve-
nile justice canon,73 they embody the core themes reflected in those decisions. 
                                                                                                                           
68 Id. at 85. 
69 Id. at 86 (emphasis added). The Miller factors are the mitigating factors for juvenile offenders 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). See Common-
wealth v. Perez, 80 N.E.3d 967, 975–76 (Mass. 2017) (listing the factors). 
70 Deal, 142 N.E.3d at 86 n.1 (Gants, C.J., concurring). In one case, the board did not change the 
name of the juvenile either. See George Vicente, No. W87303, at 1, 3 (Mass. Parole Bd. 2018), https://
www.mass.gov/doc/george-vicente-life-sentence-decision/download [https://perma.cc/3DLH-8PJ9] 
(referencing the incorrect name “Mr. Bowser” instead of Mr. Vicente within the Parole Board’s opin-
ion denying the defendant’s parole request). 
71 See Deal, 142 N.E.3d at 87 (Gants, C.J., concurring) (“Where, as here, the jury did not convict 
the parole applicant of the crime charged, the board should act with caution and care before it con-
cludes that the applicant was nonetheless guilty of the crime charged.”). The Board had deemed 
Deal’s version of events offered at the parole hearing “not plausible,” despite its consistency with the 
jury’s verdict of guilt as to only second-degree murder. Id. The Chief also noted that, even if Deal had 
denied responsibility for the killing (which he did not), “there is little, if any, empirical support for a 
link between acceptance of guilt and a decreased likelihood of recidivism.” Id. Plus, as he put it, “if a 
prisoner’s failure to acknowledge guilt alone were to suffice to support a denial of parole, a prisoner 
wrongfully convicted of murder as a juvenile might never be paroled unless he or she falsely accepted 
responsibility for a crime he or she never committed.” Id. at 88. 
72 Id. at 89. 
73 See In re Juvenile, 152 N.E.3d 1128, 1138–39 (Mass. 2020) (holding that due process does not 
allow an incompetent adult to be subject to a transfer hearing to be tried for a crime committed as a 
juvenile in adult court); Commonwealth v. Wilbur W., 95 N.E.3d 259, 276–77 (Mass. 2018) (Gants, 
C.J., concurring) (offering a novel interpretation of the child rape statute—that “abuse” be added as an 
element—to distinguish between the victim and perpetrator of rape when two minors engage in sexual 
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They show his understanding of the reality of how delinquency charges affect 
children and follow them for the rest of their lives. He constantly strove to 
lessen both the magnitude and permanence of those consequences. Because he 
recognized the long-term consequences that can result from treating children 
like criminals, he always tried to maintain a strict separation between the juve-
nile legal system—with its predominant focus on rehabilitation and the child’s 
best interests—and the severe sentencing and dispositions of the criminal legal 
system. And he led a court that pushed almost as far as any in the country in 
sentencing reform for juvenile homicide offenders. He even used one of his 
final decisions to admonish the Parole Board and urge it to ensure a meaning-
ful opportunity for release for those offenders going forward. 
Where might he have led us in the future? 
First, he likely would have advocated to raise the age of juvenile court ju-
risdiction and strengthen constitutional protections for those young adults de-
velopmentally indistinguishable from juveniles. Indeed, three years before his 
death he announced the creation of special “Young Adult Court” sessions in 
the Boston Municipal and District Courts to serve so-called “emerging adults” 
previously served in the adult sessions.74 Either through speeches or other writ-
ings, Chief Justice Gants certainly would have championed these sorts of spe-
cialty courts, or other programs that extend juvenile diversion to an older age 
cohort, if the data proved their success.75 Although he had no authority over 
                                                                                                                           
intercourse); Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 1 N.E.3d 237, 253 (Mass. 2013) (Gants, J., concurring in 
part) (disagreeing with the majority holding that, in his view, would have “needlessly” removed juve-
niles who engaged in unlawful conduct between the ages of fourteen and seventeen from the juvenile 
system and brought them into the adult system); Commonwealth v. Porges, 952 N.E.2d 917, 918 
(Mass. 2011) (holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction over crime undertaken before a person 
reaches the age of fourteen who is detained after the age of eighteen, so long as the conditions for a 
transfer hearing are satisfied); Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 933 N.E.2d 936, 939, 944 (Mass. 2010) 
(holding that a judge may conduct a dangerousness hearing of an incompetent juvenile because the 
state “bears the burden of proving dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence” and counsel for 
the juvenile can effectively vindicate their rights to present and confront evidence “to diminish the 
risk of factual mistake”); Commonwealth v. Porter P., 923 N.E.2d 36, 45 (Mass. 2010) (holding that 
the juvenile maintained a “reasonable expectation of privacy in his room” at a transitional family 
shelter). 
74 See SELEN SIRINGIL PERKER & LAEL CHESTER, PROGRAM IN CRIM. JUST. POL’Y & MGMT, 
HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., EMERGING ADULTS: A DISTINCT POPULATION THAT CALLS FOR AN AGE-
APPROPRIATE APPROACH BY THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 4 (2017), https://justicelab.columbia.edu/sites/
default/files/content/MA_Emerging_Adult_Justice_Issue_Brief_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9DH-6A6D] 
(noting that at eighteen years of age, individuals do not automatically become completely developed 
adults). 
75 See Ivy Scott, ‘Here to Help’: Springfield’s Diversion Court Points Young Adults from Prison 
to Promise, BOS. GLOBE, https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/06/19/metro/here-help-springfields-
diversion-court-points-young-adults-prison-promise/ [https://perma.cc/SK6G-LAHV] (June 19, 2021) 
(describing Hampden County’s Emerging Adult Court of Hope program, as well as a program in 
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the Juvenile Court’s jurisdictional age boundaries—either the minimum age of 
competency for Juvenile Court jurisdiction or the cutoff age at which a young 
person is treated as an adult—he perhaps would have wanted to see the Legis-
lature raise both even higher than it did in the 2018 Criminal Justice Reform 
Act. A bill pending right now would do just that: end the automatic prosecution 
of teens as adults and gradually shift eighteen- to twenty-year-old individuals 
into the juvenile legal system.76 
For all of the flaws of the juvenile legal system, “[t]he differences be-
tween being tried in the Superior Court and in the Juvenile Court are consider-
able.”77 The juvenile legal system is not a punitive one, its proceedings and 
records are closed to the public to preserve confidentiality and reduce stigma, 
and its dispositional options are vastly different (and less severe) than the crim-
inal legal system.78 If it is best to keep young children out of the juvenile court 
altogether, as the Chief recognized in Lazlo L., then it is best to keep young 
adults out of the criminal court for as long as possible.79 Data show that simi-
larly-situated young people discharged from juvenile commitments have far 
lower rates of recidivism than young adults formerly incarcerated in the crimi-
nal system.80 “Age-appropriate responses” would reduce crime and better pro-
tect public safety.81 Additional data are also in the offing: a juvenile legal sys-
tem data website created by the Juvenile Justice Policy and Data Board—a 
board itself created by the 2018 Criminal Justice Reform Act—went live in 
November 2020, just two months after the Chief’s passing.82 He would have 
followed where the data led him.83 
                                                                                                                           
Middlesex County, that extend juvenile diversion to young adults above the age of juvenile jurisdic-
tion). 
76 See H.B. 1826, 192nd Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2021) https://malegislature.gov/Bills/192/H1826 [https://
perma.cc/6RQE-ATYV] (setting forth the provisions of the act to enhance community security and 
improve conditions for young adults). 
77 Commonwealth v. Walczak, 979 N.E.2d 732, 748 (Mass. 2012) (Lenk, J., concurring). 
 78 See id.; supra notes 17–38 and accompanying text. 
79 See Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth, 122 N.E.3d 532, 542 (Mass. 2019) (describing the harm expe-
rienced by juveniles involved in the justice system). 
80 See CITIZENS FOR JUV. JUST., TESTIMONY TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE TASK FORCE ON JUVE-
NILE AGE 1, 2 (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ea378e414fb5fae5ba06c7/t/5e18d4885
33526193854222a/1578685577398/CfJJ+Recommendations+to+EAJ+Task+Force.pdf [https://perma.
cc/GU2F-YQNC] (stating that CDC data demonstrates that comparable juveniles experienced a 34% 
increased recidivism rate when treated in court as adults compared to those treated as juveniles). 
81 See PERKER & CHESTER, supra note 74, at 2 (noting that modified interventions for young 
adults can better combat recidivism). 
82 See Off. of the Child Advoc., Massachusetts Juvenile Justice System: Data and Outcomes for 
Youth, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/resource/massachusetts-juvenile-justice-system-data-and-
outcomes-for-youth [https://perma.cc/RFW5-242Z] (providing data on various aspects of the juvenile 
legal system). 
83 Of course, there is a limited role for the SJC to play directly on a related issue: whether the 
treatment of juvenile homicide offenders under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Constitution should be 
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Just as in Lazlo L., where the court, with the Chief writing, held that the 
Criminal Justice Reform Act’s revision of the age of juvenile court jurisdiction 
applied retroactively, Chief Justice Gants would likely have urged that the 
Act’s expungement provisions be read with similar breadth.84 Such an interpre-
tation follows straight from the reasoning of Lazlo L.: a narrow reading of the 
expungement statute would be “repugnant” to its purpose of lessening the im-
pact that juvenile court involvement has on a person later in life.85 The Legis-
lature’s purpose was also one of the core principles of the Chief’s juvenile jus-
tice legacy. 
                                                                                                                           
extended to the older cohort of emerging adults. See MASS. CONST. art. XXVI (setting forth the state 
constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment). Although the court has rejected such 
an extension in the past, that has often been due to a failure of preservation and presentation of evi-
dence in the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Chukwuezi, 59 N.E.3d 380, 393 (Mass. 2016) (affirm-
ing the defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 123 N.E.3d 766, 
771 (Mass. 2019) (noting the minimal record and “rapidly changing field” regarding neurological 
development of juveniles). More recently, the SJC has said that it is probably time to reassess the 
distinction between defendants aged seventeen and eighteen years. Commonwealth v. Watt, 146 
N.E.3d 414, 428 (Mass. 2020). The court remanded a case to create a record regarding available data 
on neurological development beyond seventeen years of age so it could make an educated determina-
tion about the “constitutionality of sentencing young adults to life without the possibility of parole.” 
Id. The remanded hearing was held, and the case transmitted back to the SJC. In the cases of Com-
monwealth v. Mattis and Commonwealth v. Robinson, the defendants argue that full Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk District protections should apply to this group of young adults such 
that no sentence of life without the possibility of parole could ever be imposed. See Joint Brief for the 
Defendants/Appellants on Appeal from the Suffolk County Superior Court at 71–78, Commonwealth 
v. Watt, 146 N.E.3d 414 (Mass. 2020) (No. SJC-11693), 2019 WL 5540132, at *71–78; Defendant’s 
Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial at 21–28, 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, Case No. 0084CR10975, Doc. 109 (Suffolk Superior Ct. Apr. 12, 2021). 
The Suffolk County District Attorney takes the position that Miller and Montgomery should apply to 
those between the ages of eighteen and twenty, but not Diatchenko. See Commonwealth’s Response 
to Defendant’s Motion for Relief Under MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(b) at 26–32, Commonwealth v. Robin-
son, Case No. 0084CR10975, Doc. 110 (Suffolk Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2021). Thus, in the District At-
torney’s view, these defendants are entitled to an intermediate level of protection: an individualized 
hearing where the Miller factors are considered, but life without the possibility of parole may still be 
constitutionally imposed after that hearing. See id. 
 84 See Lazlo L., 122 N.E.3d at 543 (retroactively applying the updated definition of “delinquent 
child” to pending cases). 
85 See id. at 541–42 (noting that juveniles involved in the justice system experience elevated rates 
of recidivism); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100K (2020) (setting forth the provisions for 
expungement of a criminal record relating to juvenile court proceedings under specific circumstanc-
es); Impounded Case, SJC-13107 (Mass. 2021), https://www.ma-appellatecourts.org/docket/SJC-
13107 [https://perma.cc/GUE6-34NH] (assessing the question of whether the law’s phrase “demon-
strable error by court employees” includes judicial error or just mere clerical error). The same case 
also raises the question of whether a juvenile who appears incompetent may be arraigned before a 
competency evaluation. Id. Chief Justice Gants wrote multiple decisions bearing on that question as 
well. See In re Juvenile, 152 N.E.3d 1128, 1129 (Mass. 2020) (disallowing transfer hearings for in-
competent adults whose crimes occurred when they were minors); Commonwealth v. Humberto H, 
998 N.E.2d 1003, 1014–15 (Mass. 2013) (allowing pre-arraignment dismissal of complaints against 
juveniles unsupported by probable cause). 
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CONCLUSION 
In juvenile justice, Chief Justice Gants’s decisions had a clear theme: we 
should treat children as children. If possible, children should be kept out of the 
system altogether. Once in the system, children should have every opportunity 
to get out and move on; a delinquency adjudication should not shadow them 
for the rest of their lives. Children should never be treated like criminals, and 
the things that they do should never mandate later criminal punishments. Even 
children who commit heinous crimes deserve consideration of their status as 
juveniles and a chance for release upon proven rehabilitation. Chief Justice 
Gants surely would have continued speaking out and pushing the Legislature 
and the Executive to make the changes he saw necessary to a system that has 
failed far too many children. Our future system of juvenile justice is surely far 
worse for his loss. In this way, as in countless others, he will be sorely missed. 
